Thursday, January 17, 2019

1247 Murders in Cd. Juárez in 2018
Yes, the Drug-related Violence Continues to Grow in Juaritos
About 50 Murders So Far in 2019

The grisly count:  

2013:  485 murders
2014:  430 murders
2015:  322 murders
2016:  546 murders
2017:  772 murders
2018:  1247 murders

What is Going On?

As the Chapo trial goes on in New York, we are learning much about drug trafficking at the highest levels in Mexico.  Last week we learned Mexican President Peña Nieto (2012-2018) took a $100 million bribe from Chapo to protect his activities from the law.  It has been common knowledge in Juárez that the President was protecting Chapo (Sinaloa Cartel), at the expense of the Juárez, or La Linea, cartel.  It is inconceivable that Chapo could have all but displaced the Juárez cartel--at that time perhaps the strongest drug cartel in the world--as early as 2012 without this kind of in-your-face protection from the highest levels of the federal government.  The fallout from this protection racket, however, led to many deaths.

Who is Getting Killed?  The Anatomy of  Escalating Murder in Juárez

Much of the violence in Juárez since 2007 is due to the arrival of the Sinaloa Cartel in Juárez in 2001 or so to compete with the La Linea Cartel for the highly lucrative "plaza" (territory, or city) that is an ideal platform for shipping drugs to El Paso.  Seventy percent of the cocaine going into the US goes through Juarez, according to estimates.  This competition has led to two sets of homicides.  First, those generated by efforts of one cartel to disrupt the infrastructure needed by the rival cartel.  At any given time each cartel employs a lot of people involved in the business:  transportation specialists, body shops to make false compartments in vehicles, warehousing specialists, security forces, money launderers, drivers to cross into El Paso, etc.  Occasionally one or more of these specialists will be targeted for murder as a means of interrupting the rival cartel's flow of commerce into the US. or discourage defection to the other cartel or to settle scores with a dishonest employee.  The security force used to impose discipline on the Juárez cartel is known as La Linea.  When Chapo began to compete openly for control of the plaza in 2007 the enforcement squad he created was known as the Gente Nueva, recruited from the ranks of disgruntled members of La Linea.  Some of the people killed in Juárez stem from gunfire directed by La Linea or Gente Nueva at each other or at personnel working for the other side.

The second category of homicide was created by the decision of the Juarez cartel in 2008 to add a prison gang, the Barrio Azteca, (formed in the US in 1986) as part of its security network.  As many as 5000 Azteca gang members live in Juárez, perhaps half as many in El Paso.  In response to this the Sinaloa cartel began employing two prison gangs, the Mexicles--composed of men deported from prisons in the US--and the Artistas Asesinos (or Doblados) another prison gang.  Another key decision, perhaps needed to assure a high degree to motivation, was to allow these gangs to take over the increasingly lucrative retail drug sales force in Cd. Juárez.  As drug sales in Juárez skyrocketed upwards during the past 15 years or so, turf battles have led to many deaths as one gang kills someone affiliated with a rival gang in areas thought to be within their turf.  By 2009 there were an estimated 6000 places (known as picaderos) one could go in Cd. Juarez to obtain heroin and an estimated 60 safe houses now serve to accommodate people of higher incomes who want to maintain greater anonymity.

In June of 2017 a rift within Barrio Azteca led to a faction of that gang (la vieja guardia) switching sides and joining in with the Mexicles of the Sinaloa cartel.  The fallout from that rift caused a spike in homicides and a major romantic tragedy last August. (see entries on Aug. 4 and 7 here)

These two layers of violence--cartel violence and street-gang violence in the retail sales sector of Juarez--account for most the the homicides in our city to the South.

When one president replaces another in Mexico a period of instability within the drug cartel world ensues, as each president has a major say in the establishment of the rules of the game.  During the PRI dynasty, which lasted until 2000, the rules were simple.  Drug cartels operated as franchise operations handed out at the highest levels of government.  Since then many drug operators have calculated, correctly, that they will face few consequences for violating the turf rules imposed by a president.  The national government appears to have lost its capacity to regulate competition among wannabe drug lords.  It is still unclear how AMLO, who was sworn in last month as President, will deal with this issue.

No comments: